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II
Notes on Agriculture
and the State
Raymond R Hopkins

State intervention in agriculture has a long tradition. Lindert pre
sents evidence in Chapter z for a changing pattern of agricultural
policies in the course of economic growth. In early modern European
and contemporary developing countries, the state taxes agriculture;
in modern industrial states, the government subsidizes agriculture.
This pattern does not arise from economic rationality (usually) but
from political economic forces ascendent at a particular time in a
nation’s history.
Political economy does help explain this evolution of agricultural
policy. The dynamics are more complex, however, than those usually
elaborated by economists. The purposes and consequences of state
action are often divergent. Consequences are frequently unintended
and sometimes perverse. Moreover, the very evolution of the state is
closely linked to the development of agriculture and the effects that
agricultural policies have upon it.
Anthropologists have closely linked the expansion of governing in
stitutions—from minimalist governing systems to complex, modern
state systems—with changes in agricultural production. The need to
regulate market activity and resolve land disputes for settled agricul
turalists, for instance, is postulated as the basis for the rise of African
feudal-type systems (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Mair, 1962,
pp. 29-31). Likewise, the centralization of state power and national
policies in the modern era is linked to changes in agriculture (Barraclough, 1976; Cochrane, 1979). State financing for agricultural
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modernization and the expansion of markets, some argue, played the
critical role in the modernization of Europe and the expansion of the
European state system (Wallerstein, 1974; Tilly, 1975; Tracy, 1982).
The agricultural transformation is now seen as essential for success
ful economic development in late-developing countries, such as Tur
key, and very late developers, such as Sub-Saharan African countries
(Johnston and Kilby, 1975; Eicber and Staatz, 1984; Mellor, Del
gado, and Blackie, 1987; Akay, 1988). These countries typically have
the largest portion of their labor force in agriculture and rely on ag
ricultural export earnings for developmental capital goods imports.
Their populations spend 40 to 70 percent of their household income
on food.
Agriculture is regarded as central to developing an economy and to
enhancing or undermining state authority (Scott, 1975, 1985; Hop
kins, 1986, 1988). Given this centrality, two key questions arise.
Why have states intervened in agriculture in the particular ways they
have? Why have some interventions been successful, while others
have been failures?

Purposes and Consequences
In different historical situations, states formulate different agricul
tural policies. They differ because they seek particular goals and
choose varying instruments of policy. It is difficult, of course, to be
certain about tbe real purposes of states, as opposed to the merely
stated ones. Furthermore, though formal, stated policies are generally
accessible to the historian or economist in the form of explicit legal
actions and recorded state expenditures, the actual implementation
of policies and the use of state funds may vary considerably from
those formally stated. This is particularly true in societies in which
state capacity is weak, or a “soft” state, to use Myrdal’s term.*
Throughout contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, where
countries had a dismal record in agricultural performance in the
1970s and 1980s, an examination of policies for regulating markets,
subsidizing agricultural inputs, fixing prices, and even creating nutri
tional safety nets exposed a wide gap between official policy and ac
tual performance. Effective policy instruments may thus be highly
'This idea of “soft states” is discussed in Chapter lo by Faaland and Parkinson, using
Myrdal’s 1953 distinction for Asian states.
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limited in periods of nascent state formation. Although rural popu
lations often lack organization and appear vulnerable to the interests
of the powerful, they nonetheless may pose a formidable obstacle to
state manipulation, whether in Africa in the late twentieth century or
in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Chapter 10 by
Faaland and Parkinson; Hyden, 1980; Scott, 1985; Cohen, 1988;
Glickman, 1988).
These distinctions allow us to consider the historically dynamic
process of the role of the state in agriculture. First, purposes for state
action are conceived. Second, policy choices are made. The third
stage is implementation, when the tools chosen are used. Finally, con
sequences occur that in turn affect initial purposes. This dynamic is
pervasive in the history of relations between the state and producers,
merchants, and consumers. On the one hand, cases exist in which the
state has used its resources to promote efficient agriculture, for ex
ample, through provision of collective goods, with results that are
positive for both economic and noneconomic values.^ Several Asian
states are such cases. On the other hand, states can exploit agricul
ture, thus undermining growth opportunities and alienating segments
of society, as the research by Valdes in Chapter 3 suggests.

Political Economy Considerations in the Evolution of
Agricultural Policy
The emergence of higher standards of living, thanks to industrial
ization, has led to a welfare role for states. Governments cannot
regulate markets solely in the interest of efficiency and social profit
ability (if they ever could); they also must redistribute social values
to ensure some degree of equity or justice (Okun, 1975). In the last
several centuries, responsibility for administering to the needs of
weak and vulnerable people has shifted from the private to the public
^For purposes here, the outcomes of state agricultural transactions are referred to both
in terms of benefits that are directly economic—in the sense that they yield monetized
effects whose net benefits and costs can theoretically be assessed using standard economic
accounting methodologies—and in terms of noneconomic benefits, which include impor
tant aspects of human behavior, such as loyalty to the government, voluntary compliance
with policy, national self-esteem and rectitude, and other values. These are not monetized
directly. Even shadow prices for such values would be hard to calculate since their mani
festations in society often occur in step-level events. Changes in such values, however, are
conceptually discrete movements. For example, government legitimacy can vary by degrees,
but changes in government legitimacy outside revolutionary situations are not readily
measurable.
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sector. The welfare state, with its plethora of programs that provide
citizens minimum guarantees of goods and services, is a manifest re
sult of this shift.
Food price policy has been a particularly important instrument in
developing countries affected by this shift in public demands. To
guarantee access to basic foodstuffs and augment the household in
come of the extreme poor, many policy makers have adopted such
measures as fixed prices or subsidy policies. Ethical considerations,
arising from the very fabric of society itself, lead to this redistribu
tion on behalf of the poor (Chambers, 1983). Most recently, this con
cern of the government for the equity and the poor has been
manifested (even in very poor states) in such initiatives as the
UNICEF proposal for “adjustment with a human face” and the
World Bank’s effort to achieve food security in Africa.^ Such policies
are not without economic costs, however; the frequent trade-offs be
tween equity and efficiency, between short- and long-term conse
quences, and between economic and non-economic values, become
especially poignant in cases when government capacity is already
constrained by slow rates of economic development.
Models of Political Economy

Economists frequently criticize government policy that distorts
markets. They argue that such interventions lead to non-Pareto opti
mal outcomes, reduce efficiency, slow the expansion of the produc
tion frontier, promote disincentives, and protect the unduly
privileged. Such criticisms arise not only from neoclassical assump
tions from which most economists approach social analysis but also
from a genuine concern to seek better mixes of purposes and out
comes from government intervention. Market failures, exploitative
government behavior, and policies encouraging stagnation rather
than economic growth seem pathological from this perspective. To
account for such policy failures, economists frequently blame “poli^In Ghana, for example, the government adopted in 1987 a Programme of Actions to
Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), which was designed to offset the
disproportionate or unfair burden of adjustment on vulnerable groups in Ghanaian society
brought about by the economic recovery program initiated in 1983. PAMSCAD is sup
ported by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donors. This
intervention was seen as a short-term policy designed to cushion the effects of adjustment
that were proving excessively harmful to the most vulnerable. Nevertheless, its total cost is
estimated to be U.S. $84 million, which represents over 10 percent of annual government
revenues.
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Figure 11.1. Three models of political economy

Model I: State as Arena
Groups outside government, based on rational interest calculations, seek to influence
policy.
Variant A:
.
i
i
Competitive, pluralist system: multiple groups, with changing alliances. Failure of public
interest arises from divisible benefits that provide incentives to some groups (farmers) to
pressure for policy preference, while more diffuse, larger groups are less active because
problems of collective benefits offer weak incentives to mobilize.
Variant B:
u- ■ ,
Noncompetitive, class-dominated situation: a group largely external to state officials
(e.g., bourgeoisie, salariat, ethnic groups) dictates policy.
Model II: State as Actor
State officials and titleholders act to maximize their values (wealth, safety, affection, and
so on). If the state has a high discount value, its leadership usually self-destructs. Its fea
tures are rent seeking, bureaucratic self-protection and accumulation, and extortion by in
dividuals. The state is seen by itself and others as competing with society to maintain the
privileges of the state officeholders. If the state has a low discount rate, leaders may move
toward a broader incorporation of popular interests with state interest a transformation,
especially in “weak” states, toward a Model 111 type.
Model III: State as Builder
Goals are hierarchical to meet sovereign nation-state desiderata: security, growth, and wel
fare. Weak states, typical among LDCs, give high priority to inculcating habits of compli
ance and improving the probability of enforcement. Security, particularly domestic, is a
central issue. As the state as agent becomes stronger, its capacity and interest in serving
national goals move it to allocate more resources or allow more risk in policies aimed at
economic growth and, eventually, welfare. Weak states that prematurely give high priority
to economic growth and welfare frequently fail.
There are several key questions. Which mix best characterizes an actual state at a partic
ular time? For that context, what advice about economic policy is most appropriate? For
policy advisers who usually share Model HI goals, what policies best meet the preference of
the state?

tics.” More recently, an analysis based on political economy has
sought to interpret the development and change of policy in various
historical contests (Staniland, 1985; Bates, 1989). Three basic ap
proaches to political economy can be outlined (see Figure ii.i).
State as Arena. In the first model of political economy, the state
is an arena for competing interest groups. Model I is the most prev
alent political model for describing the basis of government action,
"Each of the political economy models may be found in contemporary analyses of various writers.
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particularly among economists (Anderson, 1987; Lele and Christian
sen, 1989). Powerful interests, often urban based, as in a wbite-collar
salariat class, or grounded in powerful landowners have partial or
complete control over the instruments of the state and use them to
advance their own interests/ For these powerful groups, the only
trade-off is between short- and long-term gain; otherwise they pro
mote their group’s rational choice strategies for state action, which
will only coincidentally promote the interests of the society as a
whole (Bates, 1981).
State as Actor. In the second model of political economy, the state
is an actor in its own right. The clan of tribal societies, the royal
families of the feudal ages, and the modern bureaucratic state with
its cadres of officials are examples of the state as a rational calcu
lator of costs and benefits for maximizing state power and the in
come of its officials. Such calculations are, of course, constrained
by the pliability of the state’s subjects and tbe technology the state
can use to enforce its will as well as to foster economic efficiency.
The basic calculus, however, derives from the interests of those run
ning the state, whether royalty, a privileged class, or an entrenched
bureaucracy.
Examples of the state as self-interested actor range from the reign
of France’s Louis XIV with his diffidence toward those outside his
state {“I’etat c’est moil") to the kleptocracy of Zaire.^ Activities of
rent-seeking states have been caustically described by citizenries of
countries ranging across the ideological spectrum. The Soviet Union,
under Glasnost, has printed numerous complaints about manage
ment both in agriculture and in officialdom generally. Such popular
complaints about state-controlled exploitation are widely reported in
the literature on dependency in Latin America and Africa; attitudes
with the same valence are voiced more gently in criticisms of the
heavy hand of government expressed by the American farm popula
tion (Cochrane, 1979).
State as Builder. In the third model of political economy, the state
focuses on building its capacity. Weak states seek power but not as
an end in itself, as in the case of Model II. The state attempts to
build support and discover policies that will best serve purposes re
aper a discussion of urban bias, see Lipton (1977).

*For Zaire, see Callaghy (1984).
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quired for survival of national sovereignty (Krasner, 1988). Accord
ing to this model, the key distinction among states and their policies
arises from the state’s capacity—as ranked on a continuum from a
weak (or soft) state to a strong (or hard) one—to be an agent that is
either ephemeral and elusive or tough and effective. The writ of state
authority itself is the issue in question (Huntington, 1968). Often the
state’s capacity extends no further than the capital city or the per
sonal friendships of top leaders. A distinrtion between formal, de
jure but ineffective states and stronger de facto states is particularly
apt in modern conditions in Africa. Since 1980 several writers have
alluded to the inability of the state to adopt policies that genuinely
regulate the economy—that demonstrate capacity beyond control
over imports and exports. Even in this realm, smuggling can be a
major element allowing agriculture to escape state regulation (Hyden, 1980; Bratton, 1989). It is important to recognize that even in
countries where states represent a powerful element in society, such
as the United States and the Soviet Union, state policy is not solely in
control. Other fartors, particularly implementation problems and re
actions of individual producers or consumers, frequently lead to pol
icy outcomes quite different from those expected or predicted by
sophisticated analysis. In these conditions, actions by the state to in
tervene in agriculture, whether to support producers or consumers or
to stimulate and redistribute wealth, may also represent a series of
trials and errors in policy formation.
Purposes Served by State Intervention in Agriculture

In analyzing the history of agricultural policy in various countries,
it may be useful to identify which of the three models of the state best
fits the evolution of policies, either over all cases or at particular
times, and the purposes served by state intervention. States as actors
for themselves (Model II) are aggrandizing in character but fre
quently have short-term successes and long-term failures. Perhaps
the Philippines under Marcos fits this pattern. A state acting as an
arena for competing groups may become captured by narrow inter
ests, whether of powerful landlords or military officers, which may
lead to important policy distortions and to lost opportunities for
the economy as well as disaffection of the population (Huntington, 1968). The third vision, the state as would-be entrepreneur, may
best account for states that intervene in society primarily to bring
order and some semblance of control over agriculture; the purposes
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of such weak states may be highly transient. Since the state is not
deeply institutionalized—its leadership and circumstances change
fairly quickly—it might also he opportunistic. The state’s search for
optimizing behavior takes place under high uncertainty. Ironically,
because weak states are not anchored in tradition or legal formali
ties, they may be more erratic in the policies they follow, but they
are also more influenced by policy advice given by economists. Poli
cies of developing countries, especially those in Africa, frequently fit
this model. The use of agricultural policy to advance development
might be most critical in weak states; they have the greatest oppor
tunities to restructure agriculture, particularly after a revolution or
foreign conquest—for example, the land reforms in Japan, Taiwan,
or China.
Six purposes seem to explain historical evolution in agricultural
policy. Government intervention, whether best understood from the
viewpoint of Models I, II, or III, has nearly always involved some
mixture of these purposes, which are outlined below. Consequences
of such efforts have also shaped future capacity for undertaking pol
icies. Shortsighted, unsuccessful interventions can harm both the
state and agriculture. The success of the economic transformation of
agriculture, and the economy more generally, and the development of
national loyalties and institutionalized state structures are all deeply
interrelated consequences of evolving agricultural policy.
Extract Resources from Agriculture. The first purpose, classic for
self-serving or rent-seeking states (Model II), is to extract resources
from the agricultural sector for the purpose of state maintenance, in
cluding guaranteeing a high standard of living among official or
royal classes. Since such extraction from the production or exchange
of agricultural products serves only to redistribute wealth to office
holders and central state authorities, it represents the purest case of
exploitation. Such action is the functional equivalent of mafioso-style
extortion in the private sector. The government’s treatment of French
peasants before the 1789 revolution is a classic instance of such a
purpose dominating state policy. Zaire in the 1970s is another in
stance (Callaghy, 1984; Scott, 1985). In Models I or III, extracting
resources from agriculture may be linked by expenditure policies to
more altruistic intentions and even consequences.
Expansion of the State. The state intervenes to expand its connec
tions throughout society. The expansion of the state, for good or ill.
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requires replacing local fiefdoms and baronies with the imprint of
central authority. States thus devise policies that require low invest
ment in personnel and offer an opportunity to present central author
ity as a positive force in the life of the peasantry (Laski, 1938;
Moore, 1967; Bratton, 1989). Capitalist agriculture, for example, re
quired centralized authority over local manor systems or tribal econ
omies; the substitution of state regulations for such systems made
possible the encouragement of capitalist practices. The state acted to
assert its authority, however, rather than to base its policies on a the
ory of economic development. This assertion of authority was most
often the core purpose for such action (Tilly, 1975).
Protect Agriculture as a Resource. At times the state has inter
vened to put agriculture on a competitive basis with other economic
sectors. By nature, agriculture is a risky business. Climatic forces
make crop yields uncertain. Protection of land tenure rights and fair
marketing arrangements for the often poor and disorganized farmers
depends on laws and government. Producers who provide the physi
cal labor in agriculture, as distinguished from large landowners and
managers, frequently have little power over the affairs of state. Such
numerous but disorganized elements of society lack the free time or
direct rewards to organize and pay the cost of collective bargaining
with the state (Dahl, 1962, pp. 55-71; Olson, 1965; Lindblom,
1977). The state can serve to secure socially efficient collective ben
efits, which the “free rider” problem would otherwise cause to be
neglected.
Promote Economic Development. The state undertakes various
measures to stimulate economic development, such as investment in
agricultural research, encouragement of new technology, or greater
guarantees of profitability to producers taking risks or investing
more of their own labor. This role of the state is the classic one as
sumed by most economists (given the normative assumptions within
which most of their work is cast). With this purpose in mind, ana
lysts carefully try to assess the optimal benefit-cost ratios of various
government investments to maximize efficiency among producers,
lower marketing costs, and alleviate uneconomical fluctuations in
demand and unemployment among the poor.
Improve 'Welfare of the Poor. The promotion of equity and the
meeting of human needs is often cited as a goal of government policy.
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Subsidies targeted to the hungry poor, absorption of the adjustment
costs for those moving out of agriculture, and other state-funded com
pensatory actions may not have positive rates of return on investment
but are justified by basic ethical considerations and, secondarily, per
haps by the goal of state survival as a national, social instrument (see
the purpose of political stability below). Such interventions to assist
the poor might be a drag rather than a spur to general economic devel
opment. Egypt and Sri Lanka, for example, have been cited as cases in
which the burden of food subsidies, equaling 10 to 20 percent of total
government revenues in the 1970s, was for economic growth, a long
term negative factor. While industrialized states, such as the United
States, Europe, and other members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, may be able to afford welfare state
policies that include targeted food guarantees through programs such
as food stamps, institutional feeding, and direct distribution, their costs
are modest. Such redistribution, however, weighs heavily on states
with lower incomes, less efficient economies, and a large portion of
the population employed in agriculture (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988).
Promote Political Stability. Even from a strict economic perspec
tive, political stability, however difficult to estimate, is worth some
economic benefit.^ Maintenance of political authority reflects, in
part, the political ties, both personal and ideological, between state
leadership and the rural sector of the economy. Thomas Jefferson
regarded the agricultural ethic as the basis of American democracy—
an argument that has been supported two centuries later (McCon
nell, 1952; Hadwiger and Talbot, 1979). Analogously, agriculture as
an embodiment of state virtue has flourished under Felix HouphouetBoigny of Cote d’Ivoire. Houphouet-Boigny proclaims himself the
country’s “number one peasant.’’ Emotional and affective ties, there
fore, can bind agriculture and the state in ways that sustain national
character, project cultural values, and bolster political stability. These
cultural forces can emotionally distort the rational choice template
often placed upon government intervention (Potter, 1954; Hadwiger
and Talbot, 1979).
In summary, the state intervenes in agriculture usually to accom
plish one or several of these six purposes. Its success or failure fre^In Chapter 5, for example, Timmer cites the need for government intervention to accel
erate efficient growth and income gains to farmers and access to food for low-income
consumers, but he also argues that these interventions and others are important to main
tain political legitimacy.
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quently depends on political economic factors. In Model I the state is
an arena for powerful private forces to fix public policy. In Model II
the state is a maximizer on behalf of itself as an actor—that is, it
maximizes the private interests of officialdom. In Model III the state
is also an actor, but one motivated by sovereignty goals and highly
limited by missing information, uncertain popular loyalties, and inef
fectual instruments. The three models are not mutually exclusive;
they do, however, organize distinctive analytical elements to explain
the actions of a state. In any actual case, some mixture of all three
models is likely, but in most cases, one or another model will prove
more illuminating and prediaive of state action than others, espe
cially with respect to the state’s purpose and effect in interventions
in agriculture.
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